{"id":6821,"date":"2010-12-01T11:12:22","date_gmt":"2010-12-01T07:42:22","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/news10.hasanagha.org\/?p=3182"},"modified":"2010-12-01T11:12:22","modified_gmt":"2010-12-01T07:42:22","slug":"viewing-cable-09unvievienna553-austrian-ambassador-to-iran-describes-elections-as","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"http:\/\/news08.hasanagha.org\/?p=6821","title":{"rendered":"Viewing cable 09UNVIEVIENNA553, AUSTRIAN AMBASSADOR TO IRAN DESCRIBES ELECTIONS AS"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><a href=\"http:\/\/cablegate.wikileaks.org\/cable\/2009\/12\/09UNVIEVIENNA553.html\">Wikileaks<\/a>: If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs<\/p>\n<p>Understanding cables<br \/>\nEvery cable message consists of three parts:<\/p>\n<p>    * The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.<br \/>\n    * The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.<br \/>\n    * The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.<\/p>\n<p>To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.<\/p>\n<p>Discussing cables<br \/>\nIf you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09UNVIEVIENNA553.<br \/>\nHelp us extend and defend this work<br \/>\nReference ID \tCreated \tReleased \tClassification \tOrigin<br \/>\n09UNVIEVIENNA553 \t2009-12-09 13:01 \t2010-11-28 18:06 \tCONFIDENTIAL \tUNVIE<\/p>\n<p>VZCZCXRO1474<br \/>\nOO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK RUEHTRO<br \/>\nDE RUEHUNV #0553\/01 3431343<br \/>\nZNY CCCCC ZZH<br \/>\nO 091343Z DEC 09<br \/>\nFM USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA<br \/>\nTO RUEHC\/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0393<br \/>\nINFO RUCNIRA\/IRAN COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE<br \/>\nRUEHII\/VIENNA IAEA POSTS COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE<br \/>\nRUEHVI\/AMEMBASSY VIENNA IMMEDIATE 1500<\/p>\n<p>C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 UNVIE VIENNA 000553<\/p>\n<p>SIPDIS<\/p>\n<p>E.O. 12958: DECL: 12\/09\/2023<br \/>\nTAGS: PREL IR AU AORC KNNP<br \/>\nSUBJECT: AUSTRIAN AMBASSADOR TO IRAN DESCRIBES ELECTIONS AS<br \/>\nDRIVING TEHRAN ENVIRONMENT<\/p>\n<p>REF: UNVIE 544<\/p>\n<p>Classified By: DCM Geoff Pyatt for reasons 1.4 (c) and (e)<\/p>\n<p>\u00b61.  (C)   Summary.  On December 3, former Austrian Ambassador<br \/>\nto Tehran Michael Postl (please protect) debriefed MsnOff on<br \/>\nhis final calls on Iranian officials as he left post.  He<br \/>\nnoted that former Presidents Khatami and Rafsanjani both had<br \/>\nextracted themselves from the normal political scene and were<br \/>\nfocused on tangential issues where their weight could still<br \/>\nbe felt.  Nevertheless, Rafsanjani suggested that it would be<br \/>\nhelpful if the West spoke out against the election fraud and<br \/>\nhuman rights violations that followed.<\/p>\n<p>\u00b62.  (C)   Postl said that President Ahmadinejad&#8217;s chief of<br \/>\ncabinet, Mashaie, made clear to him prior to the Geneva talks<br \/>\nthat Iran was planning to approach the talks with a spirit of<br \/>\ncompromise and that Postl would be &#8220;surprised&#8221; by Iran&#8217;s<br \/>\nattitude.  Postl explained the lack of follow-through in the<br \/>\nwake of the talks as a probable decision by Supreme Leader<br \/>\nKhamenei that the West was not trustworthy or that Iran could<br \/>\nget more from the P5 plus 1 than the six offered in Geneva.<br \/>\nMajles Speaker Larijani&#8217;s outspoken disapproval of the Tehran<br \/>\nResearch Reactor deal advocated by Ahmadinejad could have<br \/>\nbeen an exercise of Larijani&#8217;s first opportunity to undermine<br \/>\nAhmadinejad after he was pressured to disavow himself of<br \/>\nknowledge that Iranian prisoners were being raped in jail,<br \/>\nwhich lost him credibility with the Iranian public.  Finally,<br \/>\nPostl argued that the U.S. should focus its outreach to Iran<br \/>\non formats that Iranians perceive are less biased, such as<br \/>\nBBC Persian&#8217;s version of Hardtalk or Press TV.  End Summary.<\/p>\n<p>\u00b63.  (C)   On December 3, former Austrian Ambassador to Tehran<br \/>\nMichael Postl gave MsnOff a readout of the state of domestic<br \/>\npolitical wranglings in Tehran prior to his departure from<br \/>\npost in October.  Now posted in Vienna, Postl noted that he<br \/>\nstill advises the Austrian government on Iran issues and that<br \/>\nhe was recently asked to see if his contacts in Iran would<br \/>\nmeet with him even though he had departed post.  Many said<br \/>\nthat they would, so he may be asked by the Austrian Foreign<br \/>\nMinistry to return to Iran periodically to make use of the<br \/>\nexcellent contacts he was afforded given his Farsi skills and<br \/>\nnative Iranian wife.<\/p>\n<p>\u00b64.  (C)   Postl recounted his final calls on contacts in Iran<br \/>\nbefore leaving post, noting that many who had refused<br \/>\nmeetings with him after the elections were now willing to<br \/>\nmeet him.  When he met with former President Khatami, Khatami<br \/>\nnoted that because of the post-election environment, it did<br \/>\nnot make sense to talk about politics.  Postl suggested that<br \/>\nthey discuss the possibility of Khatami pursuing a dialogue<br \/>\nof civilizations or religions that might give him an opening<br \/>\nto the West.  Khatami noted that he did want to focus more on<br \/>\nthat kind of dialogue and engagement and that he might come<br \/>\nto Austria next year in pursuit of such discussions.<\/p>\n<p>&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;-<br \/>\nFinal Calls Reveal Disillusionment with the<br \/>\nPossibilities for Change<br \/>\n&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;-<\/p>\n<p>\u00b65.  (C)   Postl noted that in his final calls, he sought out<br \/>\na meeting with the new health minister, Marzieh Vahid<br \/>\nDastjerdi since he was interested in meeting the Islamic<br \/>\nRepublic&#8217;s first female minister.  Postl described her as<br \/>\n&#8220;sort of a puppet&#8221; and very insecure despite her good<br \/>\ncredentials for the job.  She is a member of the Larijani<br \/>\nfamily, giving this influential clan placement in the<br \/>\nexecutive branch, in addition to the leverage they hold<br \/>\nthrough the key posts of Ali Larijani as Majles Speaker and<br \/>\nJavad Larijani as head of the Judiciary.  In their meeting,<br \/>\nDastjerdi and Postl discussed possible cooperation between<br \/>\nIran and Austria in hospitals, training, and person-to-person<br \/>\ncontacts in the medical field.<\/p>\n<p>\u00b66.  (C)   Postl also called on the powerful new chief of<br \/>\nPresident Ahmadinejad&#8217;s cabinet, Mashaie.  Postl said that<br \/>\nmany believed that Mashaie&#8217;s rejection for a vice<br \/>\npresidential post showed that there were disagreements<br \/>\nbetween Ahmadinejad and the Supreme Leader, but the fact that<br \/>\nhe was given the slot as head of the cabinet means that<br \/>\nKhamenei must not be fundamentally opposed to him.  Postl was<br \/>\ncandid with Mashaie, noting that although the Iranian<br \/>\nelections were an internal matter, the treatment of civilians<br \/>\nin the aftermath of the elections was wrong by any<br \/>\ncalculation.  Postl assessed that using Farsi instead of<br \/>\nEnglish made a difference in the reaction he received to this<br \/>\ncandor, and Mashaie said that he would be pleased to meet<br \/>\nwith Postl again if he were in Iran.<\/p>\n<p>UNVIE VIEN 00000553  002 OF 004<\/p>\n<p>\u00b67.  (C)   In what Postl believes was the first meeting former<br \/>\nPresident Rafsanjani had granted to a Westerner &#8212; and<br \/>\nperhaps the first meeting with a foreigner &#8212; since the<br \/>\nelections, the two discussed economic cooperation, which<br \/>\nRafsanjani said was his primary focus.  They avoided the<br \/>\ntopics of the election and the nuclear issue, especially<br \/>\ngiven the presence of 10 to 15 &#8220;watchers&#8221; from different<br \/>\nveins of the Iranian government.  Rafsanjani was very<br \/>\ninterested in non-nuclear energy cooperation and asked very<br \/>\ndetailed questions about wind energy, which Postl said<br \/>\nAustria would be able to help with.  Rafsanjani also<br \/>\ndiscussed his sense of how the Iranian government could<br \/>\nevolve, arguing that change must come from within Iran and<br \/>\nthat interference from foreigners was not welcome in most<br \/>\ncircumstances.  Nevertheless, Rafsanjani believed that the<br \/>\nbest help possible from foreigners would be to say that the<br \/>\nelections were not fair and to note the human rights<br \/>\nviolations in the aftermath, though he was not specific about<br \/>\nwhat he thought the influence of such statements would be.<br \/>\nPostl noted that recent months clearly had been hard on<br \/>\nRafsanjani; he looked pale and had lost a lot of weight, but<br \/>\nhis eyes were still &#8220;active,&#8221; according to Postl.<\/p>\n<p>\u00b68.  (C)   Postl described the positions of presidential<br \/>\ncandidates Karrubi and Musavi as children of the revolution<br \/>\nand argued that neither of them wants systemic change.<br \/>\nRather, they hoped to give Iran a &#8220;human face.&#8221;  Since the<br \/>\n&#8220;population of Iran,&#8221; according to Postl, opposes the Islamic<br \/>\nsystem, the people are not very strongly behind either of<br \/>\nthese candidates.  In closing out his comments on his final<br \/>\nmeetings in Tehran, Postl noted that after he departed post,<br \/>\nhis contacts were questioned thoroughly and aggressively,<br \/>\nwhich Postl described as a reality of life in Iran and<br \/>\ncontact with a Westerner.<\/p>\n<p>&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8211;<br \/>\nInfighting and Confusion Driving<br \/>\nthe Nuclear Issue<br \/>\n&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8211;<\/p>\n<p>\u00b69.  (C)   In his discussions at the end of September with<br \/>\nMashaie, Postl encouraged him to ensure that Iran did not<br \/>\n&#8220;miss the opportunity&#8221; presented by the talks in Geneva.<br \/>\nMashaie responded that Iran would be &#8220;sure to take&#8221; advantage<br \/>\nof this opportunity and told Postl that Postl would be<br \/>\nsurprised at Iran&#8217;s approach, that Iran would come with<br \/>\nseriousness and an attitude of compromise.  Postl&#8217;s<br \/>\nassessment is that Iran decided that this was the right time<br \/>\nto show flexibility in order to get an agreement, especially<br \/>\nsince Ahmadinejad wants to claim responsibility for an<br \/>\nagreement with the West.  Postl believes that Nuclear<br \/>\nNegotiator Jalili came to Geneva with this spirit of<br \/>\ncompromise and was following direction, presumably from<br \/>\nAhmadinejad.  Iran&#8217;s failure to follow through on these<br \/>\nagreements may have been due to a decision by Khamenei either<br \/>\nthat the West was not trustworthy despite Iran&#8217;s supposed<br \/>\ngood intentions or that Iran could get more from the West or<br \/>\nP5 plus 1 than was offered in Geneva.  Despite the fact that<br \/>\npeople close to the President say he wants &#8220;more,&#8221; the system<br \/>\ngets in the way as do Ahmadinejad&#8217;s bad advisers.  Postl&#8217;s<br \/>\ninterlocutors say that if Ahmadinejad alone were to decide<br \/>\nabout engagement with the West, &#8220;things would move more<br \/>\nquickly.&#8221;  Postl noted that Khamenei is still respected in<br \/>\nIran and, in his personal opinion, there is no essential<br \/>\ndivergence between the Supreme Leader and Ahmadinejad.  On<br \/>\nissues where the Supreme Leader&#8217;s opinions were clear, Postl<br \/>\nargued that other influential Iranians would not &#8220;touch on<br \/>\nissues,&#8221; even to undercut Ahmadinejad.  The only way to<br \/>\nchallenge these leaders was to focus on &#8220;unjust&#8221; or<br \/>\nun-Islamic behavior.<\/p>\n<p>\u00b610.  (C)   Postl said that Majles Speaker Larijani probably<br \/>\nwas not in favor of the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) deal,<br \/>\nbut when MsnOff questioned whether he really opposed the deal<br \/>\nor was responding to the fact that Ahmadinejad came out in<br \/>\nfavor of the deal, Postl recounted another possibility tied<br \/>\nto the post-election environment.  Postl noted that he had<br \/>\nasked someone close to Larijani whether he was aware of the<br \/>\nrapes of election-related prisoners.  The interlocutors said<br \/>\nthat not only was Larijani aware, but all officials were<br \/>\naware of what was going on inside the prison.  Nevertheless,<br \/>\nwhen Larijani spoke publicly about the issue, he stated<br \/>\nclearly that the rapes are not occurring and thus lost some<br \/>\ncredibility with the Iranian public.  To have not given a<br \/>\nmore ambiguous response, such as that he would look into the<br \/>\nsituation, Larijani must have been under strong pressure from<br \/>\nabove, in Postl&#8217;s estimation.  Given the clarity that what<br \/>\nAhmadinejad had done after the election was wrong and<br \/>\nLarijani&#8217;s distaste for Ahmadinejad, the TRR proposal may<br \/>\nhave been Larijani&#8217;s first opportunity to strike back at<\/p>\n<p>UNVIE VIEN 00000553  003 OF 004<\/p>\n<p>Ahmadinejad.<\/p>\n<p>\u00b611.  (C)   Postl also noted that Iran probably has whiplash<br \/>\nfrom the international community&#8217;s response to the Fordow<br \/>\nFuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP), which will complicate our<br \/>\nefforts to press Iran into compliance with its obligations.<br \/>\nAlthough IAEA Director General ElBaradei said after the first<br \/>\ninspection of the FFEP that it was nothing more than &#8220;a hole<br \/>\nin a mountain,&#8221; the IAEA Board of Governors passed a<br \/>\nresolution against Iran, citing the FFEP as one of its main<br \/>\npoints (ref A). Postl argued that this probably leads Iran to<br \/>\nbelieve that the international community is not serious about<br \/>\nthe issue, and that, rather, this is &#8220;a game.&#8221;<\/p>\n<p>\u00b612.  (C)   One of Postl&#8217;s contacts close to the Supreme<br \/>\nLeader pointed him to a Kayhan article from December 1,<br \/>\nwritten by editor Shariatmadari, which espouses the views of<br \/>\nKhamenei on the nuclear issue.  The article argues that Iran<br \/>\nhas gotten nothing from cooperation and should withdraw from<br \/>\nthe NPT immediately.  Since Khamenei has said that he is not<br \/>\nopposed to an opening with the U.S., it becomes about<br \/>\nWashington presenting the right arguments at the right time.<br \/>\nHowever, Postl said that bringing up the issue of the<br \/>\ndetained Americans at Geneva probably fell flat with the<br \/>\nIranians.  Iranian officials told Postl that they were<br \/>\nsurprised that American officials raised this issue at those<br \/>\ntalks.  This was the wrong time to bring up this issue, Postl<br \/>\nargued, since these issues are not connected in the minds of<br \/>\nthe Iranians.  (We will explain to the Austrians why this<br \/>\nissue is so important and resonates so much to the U.S.)<br \/>\nPostl suggested that the UK model was better:  when their<br \/>\nsailors were captured, UK officials said that this issue had<br \/>\nnothing to do with the political problems between the two<br \/>\ncountries.  The dissociation of the issues worked in favor of<br \/>\ngetting the sailors released.  Pressed on when might be such<br \/>\na right time to address the U.S. detainees, Postl suggested<br \/>\nthat one such way might have been to capitalize on the<br \/>\nOctober 1 Geneva talks by following up quickly with a call<br \/>\nfrom Under Secretary Burns to Jalili &#8220;in the spirit of<br \/>\nGeneva.&#8221;  During that phone call, Burns could engage Jalili<br \/>\non the detainee issue as an aside.  Postl also noted that<br \/>\nsome of his Iranian government contacts had noted with<br \/>\npleasure the appointment of Ambassador Limbert to deal with<br \/>\nthe Iranian file given his understanding of Iran.<\/p>\n<p>&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;-<br \/>\nPostl&#8217;s Tehran Retrospective<br \/>\n&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;-<\/p>\n<p>\u00b613.  (C)   Looking back on his tenure as Ambassador to Iran,<br \/>\nPostl noted that the biggest &#8220;game changer&#8221; had been this<br \/>\npast summer&#8217;s presidential elections.  The events were<br \/>\ncausing backlash from much of the population.  Parents and<br \/>\ngrandparents were saying, according to Postl, that they do<br \/>\nnot want their children to be forced to experience the same<br \/>\nIran that they, themselves, have been living under for the<br \/>\nlast 30 years.  For the first time, one can see &#8220;kill<br \/>\nKhamenei&#8221; and &#8220;death to Khamenei&#8221; scrawled on walls in<br \/>\nTehran.  These direct challenges to Khamenei&#8217;s authority are<br \/>\nnew and significant.  Additionally, Postl expects that the<br \/>\npopulation was disillusioned by the overwhelming fraud in the<br \/>\nelections and many will not vote in the future.<\/p>\n<p>\u00b614.  (C)   On engagement, Postl suggested that some ways<br \/>\nforward for the U.S. and Iran might be to look into using a<br \/>\nroute from Chah Bahar, on Iran&#8217;s southern coast, to get U.S.<br \/>\nsupplies into Afghanistan and using the assumption of office<br \/>\nby new IAEA Director General Amano to press for &#8220;a new start&#8221;<br \/>\non the Additional Protocol and additional transparency<br \/>\nmeasures discussions.<\/p>\n<p>\u00b615.  (C)   Postl reiterated his message that Iranian citizens<br \/>\nsee the Voice of America (VOA) as biased and asked that we<br \/>\nnot underestimate their frustration.  If they see a pervasive<br \/>\nmedia outlet as biased, this presents the U.S. in a negative<br \/>\nlight and works against U.S. messaging. He said that Iranians<br \/>\ncurrently are faced with two biased choices: VOA and Iranian<br \/>\nBroadcasting (IRIB).  In response to a MsnOff question about<br \/>\nhow BBC Persian is perceived, he noted that it is seen as<br \/>\nmore neutral, but has the stigma of being associated with the<br \/>\nUK.  Postl floated the idea of U.S. support to Euro News to<br \/>\nstart broadcasting in Farsi.  He also suggested that doing<br \/>\nHardtalk in Persian might be one of the best outlets for U.S.<br \/>\narguments since the format of pitting opposing viewpoints<br \/>\nagainst one another would counteract the perception of bias,<br \/>\nbut suggested that if our arguments to the Iranian people are<br \/>\nnot convincing, this quickly would become clear.  Finally,<br \/>\nPostl noted that the U.S. should not shy away from interviews<br \/>\nwith Iranian media outlets, suggesting Press TV because it is<br \/>\nin English and it is watched in Tehran.  A program built<\/p>\n<p>UNVIE VIEN 00000553  004 OF 004<\/p>\n<p>around broadcasting the differing opinions of the U.S., India<br \/>\n(because its opinion is well-respected given its influence as<br \/>\na leader in the Nonaligned Movement), and Iran might be a<br \/>\nuseful way to get our messages across while counteracting<br \/>\nperceptions of bias.<br \/>\nDAVIES<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Wikileaks: If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs Understanding cables Every cable message consists of three parts: * The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":[],"categories":[14,4],"tags":[3874,2051,452,2792,2057,3884,55,757,3885,1746],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"http:\/\/news08.hasanagha.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/6821"}],"collection":[{"href":"http:\/\/news08.hasanagha.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"http:\/\/news08.hasanagha.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/news08.hasanagha.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/news08.hasanagha.org\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=6821"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"http:\/\/news08.hasanagha.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/6821\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"http:\/\/news08.hasanagha.org\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=6821"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/news08.hasanagha.org\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=6821"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/news08.hasanagha.org\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=6821"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}