خودنویس: به گزارش سایت «اندورینگ آمریکا» یک ایرانی در تابستان سال ۲۰۰۷ به سفارت آمریکا در لندن رفته و گفته بود که سپاه پاسدارن در عراق با آمریکا همکاری خواهد کرد، اما قرار دادن سپاه در فهرست نهادهای تروریستی مانع چنین همکاری‌ای خواهد شد. این ایرانی فردی جز برادر فرمانده سابق سپاه پاسداران انقلاب اسلامی نبوده است.

در گزارش اولیه به وزارت خارجه آمریکا که بعدا از طریق ویکی‌لیکس منتشر شده، یک فرد که xxxxxxxxxxxx خوانده شده در لندن با مقام‌های سفارت آمریکا گفتگو کرده است.

بر اساس گزارش آمده در ویکی لیکس، این منبع حملات حمایت شده از سوی سپاه پس از اشغال عراق در ۲۰۰۳ را تایید کرده است. این فرد همچنین گفته است که سپاه پاسداران بعد از دولت خاتمی، نقشی محوری در ایران بازی می‌کند.

در گزارش دیپلمات‌های سفارت آمریکا در لندن، به تایید حضور سپاه پاسداران در عراق و افغانستان از سوی این منبع اشاره شده است.

پس از افشای کلید رمز ویکی‌لیکس، معلوم شد که این منبع فردی جز یک روحانی مقیم لندن به نام سلمان صفوی نبوده است، اما اهمیت موضوع زمانی بیشتر می‌شود که «سلمان» برادر فرمانده کل سپاه پاسداران در همان زمان بوده است.

معلوم نیست که آیا مذاکره با دیپلمات‌های آمریکایی با اجازه و یا هدایت فرمانده کل سپاه انجام گرفته است یا نه.

متن پیام اولیه روی ویکی‌لیکس:

¶1. (C) Summary. xxxxxxxxxxxx Iran Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) xxxxxxxxxxxx told London Iran Watcher xxxxxxxxxxxx that Iran’s cooperation on security in Iraq, though not yet evident, would be forthcoming, but in the same breath argued that a U.S. terrorist designation of the IRGC would prevent any such cooperation. xxxxxxxxxxxx for the USG to hold its hand on designation came xxxxxxxxxxxx engaged with the invited group at length on Tehran’s view of U.S.-Iran relations, Iraqi security, and the nuclear issue. xxxxxxxxxxxx candid remarks, which included extremely vigorous exchanges with xxxxxxxxxxxx alternated between aggressive characterizations of Iran’s relations in the Persian Gulf, admissions of the IRGC’s presence and role in Iraq and Afghanistan, and apparently earnest statements of Iran’s desire for cooperation with the United States. xxxxxxxxxxxx appeared to pay close attention to xxxxxxxxxxxx message on need for Iran’s behavior in Iraq to match its stated support for Iraqi stability and for Iran to weigh the benefits of the E3 3 incentives package and “suspension for suspension” offer which remains on the table. End Summary.

xxxxxxxxxxxx Private Plea on IRGC Designation

¶2. (C) xxxxxxxxxxxx made his private plea on not designating the IRGC under U.S. law after a three-hour long larger group discussion during which xxxxxxxxxxxx had stressed that attacks on U.S. forces in Iraq by militias using Iranian-provided ordnance had actually increased from May to July, despite Iran’s claim to support Iraqi stability. xxxxxxxxxxxx stated that the USG would soon see (he was vague on how soon) evidence of Iranian security cooperation in the form of diminished attacks, taking the July discussions in Baghdad — as opposed to those held in May — as the point at which the IRGC had decided it could go forward with such cooperation. xxxxxxxxxxxx described how IRGC orders to “our allies” are “in the pipeline,” but it takes time for such orders to be disseminated throughout Iraqi militia networks and acted upon (“it is a very large machine, with delayed effect”).

¶3. (C) By way of illustration of this delayed implementation phenomenon, xxxxxxxxxxxx said there had been an unintended attack “by our (Shiite Iraqi) allies” on UK forces immediately after the release of the UK naval hostages last April. xxxxxxxxxxxx said the IRGC had indeed issued an order for attacks on UK forces, in response to what he called an earlier UK attack on the Iranian consulate in Basra, but that Iranian expression of unhappiness had been satisfied with the hostage episode, and that IRGC authorities were consequently exasperated by the militia attack occuring shortly after the hostage resolution. xxxxxxxxxxxx said their Iraqi “allies” explained the incident as the result of a standing “general order” to launch such attacks, which had not yet been rescinded. xxxxxxxxxxxx indicated that similar organizational snafus lie behind the current continuing attacks on U.S. forces in Iraq.

¶4. (C) xxxxxxxxxxxx went on to argue, however, that a USG designation of the IRGC as a terrorist organization would effectively end all interest, or political ability, of the IRGC to cooperate with the USG on Iraqi or Afghan security. He stressed that, unlike “a few years ago, under Khatami,” the IRGC plays a central and preeminent role in the Iranian government and that, if the IRGC is designated as a terrorist organization, the USG will have no Iranian partner with which to engage on security or other issues of mutual concern. xxxxxxxxxxxx said it makes no difference to Iran whether the proposed IRGC designation is done under U.S. domestic law or international authority — all sanctions, financial measures and designations are seen by Iranian authorities and the public as authored by America, with international partners such as the E3 plus 3 and the UN as mere cutouts for U.S. initiatives. The practical effects of such measures are unimportant to the Iranian Government, but the symbolic and psychological consequences do matter.

Group Discussion Highlights

¶5. (C) The evening’s larger group discussion had several highlights:

— A (surprising) degree of self-professed confusion by xxxxxxxxxxxx at the what he called the “multiple and conflicting signals” on Iran policy from various parts of the USG including the Congress;

— An open acknowledgment by xxxxxxxxxxxx that the IRGC is present and operating in both Afghanistan and Iraq (with U.S. occupation and Sunni attacks on Shias given as a justification);

— xxxxxxxxxxxx description of Shiite militias in Iraq as “our allies, whom we created against Saddam;”

— Fiery statements by xxxxxxxxxxxx on U.S. injustices perpetrated over the years against Iran, on Iran’s resolve and capabilities to launch military and asymmetric responses, and on how Iran should replace or join with the United States as the Gulf region’s “co-manager,” all of which provoked vehement rejoinders from xxxxxxxxxxxx;

— xxxxxxxxxxxx reflections on a more mature Iran’s no-longer-revolutionary approach to its foreign relations;

— xxxxxxxxxxxx repeated return to the theme of desiring a constructive and cooperative relationship with the U.S., first on Afghanistan and Iraq and secondly on the nuclear issue;

— xxxxxxxxxxxx near-gloating remarks on Hezbollah’s 2006 conflict with Israel; and

— xxxxxxxxxxxx description of the United States as having become Iran’s “hostage” in Iraq (“you cannot stay and you cannot leave … your forces there and in the region are our target”).

Comment

¶6. (C) Although impeccably turned out, outwardly genial, and speaking with confidence and an evident sense of authority, xxxxxxxxxxxx appeared to be under significant stress and at great pains to listen carefully and closely to all interlocutors, and especially to xxxxxxxxxxxx (standard) comments on the E3 plus 3 offer, as well as the need for Iranian behavior change in Iraq. xxxxxxxxxxxx apparently genuine desire to engage and move towards cooperation was coupled to his equally apparent sense that Iran is entitled to use violent means against us until such time as there a change in the USG’s “regional behavior.”

Biographical Background

¶7. xxxxxxxxxxxx